Henry Kissinger and Soviet-American Relations in 1970th | Статья в журнале «Молодой ученый»


Рубрика: Политология

Опубликовано в Молодой учёный №7 (42) июль 2012 г.

Статья просмотрена: 30 раз

Библиографическое описание:

Умаров С. Я. Henry Kissinger and Soviet-American Relations in 1970th // Молодой ученый. — 2012. — №7. — С. 200-202. — URL https://moluch.ru/archive/42/5063/ (дата обращения: 25.05.2018).

A state secretary of the USA Henry Kissinger, indisputably, is one of the most noticeable figures in world diplomacy of the second half of XX age. Being one of architects of discharging policy, he played a considerable role in development of the Soviet-American relations in 1970th.

Kissinger came in the White house from an academic environment, possessing solid intellectual luggage and deserved glory of one of leading specialists in area of international relations and foreign policy of the United States. Having complex conception of peace and own vision of the American foreign policy, Kissinger got unique possibility to realize them in practice, especially as president Nixon during electioneering developed similar ideas in a great deal. It appears that a study of conceptual grounds of policy of Kissinger in regard to Soviet Union is one of most interesting that in the analysis of origin of the «large discharging».

Traditionally at research of changes in the American foreign policy, happenings in the period of presidency of Nixon and Ford, select such factors, as war in Vietnam and growth of protest moods is in American society, achievement of approximate priority Soviet Union in area of strategic armaments, and also course of Sh. de Golly and Willy Brandt on development of friendly relationships with the USSR [1]. Here it is quite just it will be to add influence of human factor, in particular, perception of Kissinger of structure of peace on the that stage. At the end of 1960th he came to the conclusion about completion of era of super countries. Exactly bipolarity in the conditions of presence at the super countries of enormous arsenals of nuclear weapon was perceived Kissinger as a root of all of those dangers and failures which were the attribute of international life after completion of Second World War. Exactly it became the «source of inflexibility in a foreign policy». «Bipolar world, – Kissinger wrote, – loses a prospect for a nuance; acquisition of one side appears an absolute loss for other. Every problem, seems, affects the question of survival». In addition, rivalry of super countries and sharp crises as his display was outshone by itself row, possibly, less bright, but so important tendencies of international life, for example, influence of technological revolution on international relations and output on the world arena of new active players from a number the countries of the third world [2].

In works of Kissinger 1950th – 1960th Soviet Union was characterized as revolutionary power. He presents a basic threat peace, both directly because of possessing enormous military potential and policy of export of communist ideology and through the actions of the satellites (especially in «hot points» and on world periphery). However by the end of 1960 the Kissinger comes to the conclusion, that Soviet Union lost many of signs, inherent revolutionary powers actually. Principal reason of change in the looks of Kissinger is the thesis pulled out by him about priority of considering of safety and necessity of peacekeeping in a nuclear era before the ideological options of opposing sides. On the idea of Kissinger, inhibition and destructive character of modern weapon gave Soviet Union the that feeling to which revolutionary power aspires and which it can not attain without smashing of all of the opponents – sense of own safety [3].

Walking of Soviet Union away from revolutionary traditions in a foreign policy from considering of safety, which dictate the necessity of joint efforts on the construction of «stable structure of order», on the idea of Kissinger, fully able to fill in absence of single for leading powers of conception legitimity of the existent international system and general values in ideology. Moreover, the ideological considering must were step back on the second plan, as they darken by itself many of vital problems of contemporary. In this sense right P. Hoffmann, which considered the idea of «stable structure of the world» the modernized version of «legitimate order» in a that kind in which it was developed Kissinger in works of end 1950th [4] Both in that and in other case it must line up an international order with bringing in of resources of all of basic actors and taking into account their historical aspirations and national experience. Thus, each of them would bring in the contribution to viability of all of the system on the whole and would accept its existence.

From here fully clear, why Kissinger and Nixon positioned the policy – at least such was is their rhetoric, especially on the nosedive of discharging – as directed on overcoming of inflexibility of conception of inhibition [5]. «Large strategy» on weakening of international tension which it was endeavoured to formulate Nixon and Kissinger and the major element of which was a thesis about the origin of the multipolar world, promised nothing more dynamic, than indolence of inhibition.

By a key moment for providing of leadership of the United States and providing of space for a diplomatic maneuver in relationships with the USSR of Nixon and Kissinger counted rapprochement with Chinese Folk Republic[6]. The «diplomatic triangle» of USA-USSR-China. Republic of China needed administration of Nixon for the decision of two most general tasks: completions of war in Vietnam in the earliest possible date and successful for America end of negotiations on limitation of strategic armaments. Proceeding in the American-Chinese dialog, from point of Kissinger, served a powerful irritant, stimulating large pliability of the USSR on different questions of bilateral relations [7].

The political tying up is much more thorny problem. Many suggestions, pulled out Moscow already in a cut-in administration of Nixon, are convocation of conference on European safety, the beginning of negotiations on OSV – followed with the decision of sharp problems, standings before the United States. So, coming from in the everyday use for the epoch of cold war of position that the actions of communists all over the world are controlled Moscow, president already in February, 1969 during one of conversations with A.F. Dobryninym tied up the beginning of negotiations on OSV with rolling up of help North Vietnam Moscow [8]. Therefore, Blyumink writes, «typical local conflicts were not settled, because every problem followed with a global rivalry between two super countries. All-embracing strategy of tying up did not simply work. Advices were less guided, what Nixon and Kissinger» [9] thought. In addition, as specified Hoffmann, «most agreements (both in trade and in the sphere of control above armaments) were inalienably based on general or similar interests. At least, a consensus which a policy» [10] must be based on weakens or destroys the punitive use of tying up.

Finally, the third aspect of tying up was geopolitical. Being of the Cuban troops in Angola in 1975-1976 was examined Kissinger as an expansionist policy of Moscow, continental power, aspiring to spread the influence in a global scale. Therefore exactly with Kremlin, but not with Havana negotiated about their conclusion. Progress in preparation agreement of OSV-2 in 1976 also closely followed with the requirements of conclusion of the Cuban troops from Angola [11]. From this geopolitical making tying up, Blyumink marks, and aspiration of Kissinger to restrain the USSR on all of earth followed, although exactly in the years of discharging inhibition was weaker, than some time [12].

In memoirs Kissinger undertook an attempt to estimate the value of tying up for American foreign-policy tradition on the whole and discharging politicians – in particular. He described it as aspiration to «release our foreign policy from vibrations between super involved and isolation and to base it on hard conception of national interests». To do it, he noticed, it was necessary to set priorities. A «conceptual structure which “links” events is a major instrument. Absence of tying up is opposition to freedom of action; political figures are forced to follow particularistic interests, pushed slightly pressure without the set compass».A just the same policy resulted in considerable to the splash of soviet expansion in the years of presidency of Carter [13].

R. Hoffmann pulled out yet more frank argument. He supposed that tying up – not simply «fact of life» or even conceptual instrument. Rather it is the active instrument of policy. In this quality, tying up with most readiness is acknowledged as tactic, called to expose facilities for achievement aims, can to become a bargain item. But it is beyond an instrument for the conduct of negotiations. «At Nixon and Kissinger tying up became a basic mean for application and adjusting of stimuli and fines, which they placed in a center their conception of diplomatic strategy. In final analysis, a question about the role of tying up depends not on that, whether there is it by the possible instrument of policy, and from that, whether own this instrument reasonably or not, from that, whether balanced, finish say or imposed private tying up, and from that, whether they succeed in advancement of aims of policy or only detain them» [14].

In our view, in spite of row of failures, strategy of tying up was conducted Kissinger with the known flexibility and instrumental in the decision of vital tasks, standings before the American foreign policy. Its role is obvious in durance vile the Parisian peaceful agreements on Vietnam.

We will appeal to the question about what discharging was for Kissinger. It is necessary at once to mark that its conception, developed them and Nixon in 1969-1972, did not have character of the expressly marked doctrine which would be inculcated in practice. A self word «detent» was not utilized in the official lexicon of Nixon and Kissinger approximate 1973 to We will accede to Hoffmann, which considered that this conception had arisen up gradually as part of process of improvement of American-soviet relations, «mostly as foundation of political strategy, than what it made a source or basis of this strategy» [15].

Nixon and Kissinger examined discharging as strategy, but not as purpose; it was a mean, but not result. In the same time, in order that to justify strategy and get political support, in public discharging was clear formulated in terms of high purpose – world «structure». In the message to General Assembly of United Nations in 1970, in which Nixon first utilized a term «discharging», he matched against it the «policy of force», saying that «we must overcome the old standards of policy of force, by which country aimed to exploit every changing situation to the own benefit or press out a maximal benefit on your own from every negotiations» [16]. Such statement least corresponded intentions of administration to utilize force for achievement of the put aims (for example, completion of war in Vietnam).

Perhaps, most capacious determination what a discharging policy is for administration, Kissinger gave in 1974 g.: «Discharging is not engrained in agreements in relation to values: it becomes necessary foremost because every side acknowledges other a potential opponent in nuclear war. For us discharging is a process of management relationships with a potentially hostile country in an order to keep the peace, supporting our vital interests. ... Discharging is based on frank confession of base distinctions and dangers. Exactly because we were conscious existence of these distinctions, we aimed to place our relationships with the USSR in more steady structure – structure of associate and interdependent agreements. Forward movement in our relations must go at the wide front – affecting the wide range of mutually strengthening actions – so that groups and individuals in both countries had general interest in maintenance of the world and strengthening of steady international order»[17].

Nevertheless, adherence not at all means this point of view, what only Moscow is accountable for the new coil of tension in the world, happening at the end of 1970th – to the first half 1980th It is necessary to acknowledge, what the United States were not able to realize present for them potential for overcoming of legacy of cold war. In historiography there are a few estimations of reasons that, why Kissinger in the period of his work in administrations of Nixon and Ford, in spite of all of his talents of diplomat, it was not succeeded to convert discharging into the long-term factor of international life, in the mean of stabilizing of world order, constructions of new and protracted «structure of the world».

Thus, Kissinger in the period of his work in administrations of Nixon and Ford, in spite of all of his talents of diplomat, it was not succeeded to convert discharging into the long-term factor of international life, in the mean of stabilizing of world order, constructions of new and protracted «structure of the world».

Sure, Henry Kissinger played a considerable role in the Soviet-American relations 1970th It is necessary to estimate his deposit as positive: were decided many of important political problems of those years, important precedents as between the USSR and USA, instrumental in completion of cold war at the end of 1980th are set Today Kissinger also plays a certain role in the Russian-American relations. His meetings with V. Putin, on which he comes forward as the personal envoy G. Bush-little, in opinion of observers, is instrumental in the best understanding of both countries of policy of other side and making of the concerted line leaders to on to many to the problems of contemporary.


  1. Garthoff R. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Wash., 1985, Американская историография внешней политики США. 1945-1970. М., 1972; Ди Нольфо Э. От истоков холодной войны до энергетического кризиса 1973 г. Ч. II. Пер. с ит. М., 2001; Фурсенко А.А. Миссия Киссинджера в Париж и Бонн в 1966 г. // Новая и новейшая история. 1983. № 2; Филитов А.М. СССР и «новая восточная политика ФРГ» // Холодная война и политика разрядки: дискуссионные проблемы. / Отв. ред. Н.И. Егорова, А.О. Чубарьян. М., 2003. Вып. 1. С 163-186; и др.

  2. Kissinger H.A. American Foreign Policy. Exp. ed. N.Y., 1974. P. 56.

  3. Kissinger H.A. American Foreign Policy. P. 61-62; See also: Idem. Reflections on Containment // Foreign Affairs. 1994. Vol. 73, № 3. May / June. P. 113-130.

  4. Hoffmann S. Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War. N.Y., 1980. P. 43. The analysis of Kissindzherom of tipologii of world order is most essential in this sense, contained in his book on realities of Post-Napoleon's Evropy: Kissinger H. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822. Boston, 1957.

  5. Kissinger H. White House Years. Boston-Toronto. 1979. P. 221.

  6. Nixon R. Asia after Viet Nam; U.S. Government. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1969-1972 (далее – FRUS) // http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/Nixon/i/ 20700.htm

  7. Киссинджер Г. Дипломатия. М., 1997. С. 664; See also: Zubok, V. The Brezhnev Factor in Détente // Холодная война и политика разрядки: дискуссионные проблемы. Вып. 1. P. 298.

  8. Burr W. Henry Kissinger and American Power in a Multipolar World // The Kissinger Transcripts. The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow / Ed. by W. Burr. N.Y., 1998. P.10 See also:.Корниенко Г.М. «Холодная война»: Свидетельство ее участника. М., 1994. С. 138;

  9. Brown S. The Crises of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy during the Kissinger Era. N.Y., 1979. P. 127; Hanhimaki J. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. L. 2004.

  10. Hoffmann S. Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War. N.Y., 1980. P. 43

  11. The Kissinger Transcripts. P. 438-439, 454-455.

  12. Bluemink G. Op. cit. P. 209.

  13. Kissinger H. The Future of American Foreign Policy // Kissinger H. For the Record. P. 290-291.

  14. Garthoff R. Op. cit. P. 32-33.

  15. Ibid. P. 69.

  16. Litwak R. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976. Cambridge, 1984. P. 111.

  17. Eldridge A. Pondering Intangibles: A Value Analysis of Henry Kissinger // Henry Kissinger, His Personality and Policies / Ed. by. D. Caldwell. Durham, 1983. P. 64-85.

Основные термины (генерируются автоматически): USSR, USA, OSV, Холодная война, политик разрядки, FRUS.


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