Introduction

The strategic landscape of East Asia in the twenty-first century has emerged as the central theater of global power transition. The United States, determined to preserve its hegemonic status and maintain a liberal maritime order, has reinforced an intricate network of bilateral and multilateral alliances stretching from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines and Australia (Cha, 2016; Green, 2017). China, propelled by unprecedented economic growth and technological modernization, interprets this network as a deliberate architecture of military encirclement designed to constrain its rise and project coercive pressure along its maritime periphery (Yan, 2019; Zhao, 2019). The perception of encirclement has thus evolved into a structural determinant of Beijing’s defense policy and strategic culture. This perception is not merely theoretical but rooted in concrete developments that have heightened Chinese insecurity. The 2017 deployment of the U. S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea and the 2021 announcement of the AUKUS pact-granting Australia access to nuclear-propelled submarine technology were both condemned by Beijing as direct threats to regional stability and national sovereignty (Department of Defense, 2022; Ministry of National Defense, 2019). These events exemplify how Washington’s deterrence initiatives are interpreted in China as evidence of strategic containment, reinforcing the narrative of encirclement that underpins the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) defensive modernization.

While Washington frames its forward posture as a guarantor of “freedom of navigation” and regional stability (Department of Defense, 2022), Beijing views the same deployments as intrusive and destabilizing. The dialectical tension between reassurance and insecurity, deterrence and provocation, lies at the heart of the contemporary security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific (Jervis, 1978). This research seeks to determine how and to what extent the perceived encirclement produced by U. S. alliance architecture has influenced the formulation and implementation of China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy as a counter-intervention response. The study’s relevance stems from the accelerating militarization of East Asia, where technological diffusion and strategic misperception threaten to transform deterrence into confrontation (Friedberg, 2022). Its novelty resides in linking perception theory with empirical military evolution — an intersection often overlooked by structural realist analyses that privilege material capabilities over cognitive variables. The objective is to map the architecture of U. S. alliances, trace the evolution of Chinese threat perceptions, identify the operational components of A2/AD, and evaluate their collective impact on regional stability and U. S. operational planning. By synthesizing theoretical realism, documentary analysis, and chronological tracing, the research reveals the causal logic that connects alliance behavior to counter-intervention strategy and contributes to refining realism through the inclusion of perception as an explanatory variable (Larson & Shevchenko, 2019).

Literature Review

The theoretical backbone of this inquiry is realism, the most enduring paradigm of international relations theory. Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism conceptualizes the state as a security-seeking actor that arms itself primarily to survive in an anarchic system (Waltz, 1979), whereas John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism contends that great powers maximize power to secure hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2014). Both interpretations underscore self-help and balance of power, yet diverge in motive. Applied to the U. S. — China dyad, Washington’s alliance reinforcement may be defensive in intention but appears offensive to Beijing, generating the classic security dilemma first elaborated by Jervis (1978) where one side’s quest for security inexorably produces the other’s sense of insecurity. Within Chinese strategic thought, the concept of active defense (jiji fangyu) embodies this paradox: offensive operations conducted for defensive ends (PLA Academy of Military Science, 2013). Studies by scholars such as Yan Xuetong and Zhao Tingyang extend realism with indigenous philosophical elements, portraying China’s strategy as a moral balance between power and order (Yan, 2019; Zhao, 2019). Yet empirical behavior often mirrors realist logic more than idealist aspiration. Western analyses have extensively dissected the U. S. “hub-and-spokes” alliance system. Victor Cha (2016) characterizes it as hierarchical yet flexible, while Green (2017) and Friedberg (2022) emphasize its adaptability to evolving threats. Contemporary research highlights how initiatives like the Quad, AUKUS, and enhanced defense cooperation with the Philippines operationalize the concept of integrated deterrence across multiple domains (Department of Defense, 2022; IISS, 2024). From Beijing’s vantage, however, these initiatives confirm the existence of a containment ring.

Chinese policy journals such as Guofang Keji and PLA Daily frequently describe U. S. missile defense and surveillance networks as attempts to “neutralize China’s strategic deterrent” (Ministry of National Defense, 2019). Scholars including Andrew Erickson, Roger Cliff, and Dean Cheng have documented the evolution of A2/AD capabilities DF-21D and DF-26 missiles, Type-055 destroyers, and cyber and space units–while noting that these developments are defensive countermeasures rooted in fear of encirclement rather than aspirations for regional domination (Erickson & Wuthnow, 2020; Cliff, 2015; Cheng, 2013). Other analysts, including Hugh White (2019) and Graham Allison (2017), situate this competition within the logic of a Thucydidean trap, warning that mutual threat perception may push both powers toward accidental war despite rational cost calculations. Yet a critical gap persists: most studies examine either the technological dimension of A2/AD or the institutional dynamics of U. S. alliances in isolation, rarely integrating them through the lens of strategic perception. This research addresses that lacuna by correlating doctrinal texts, alliance initiatives, and military reforms to demonstrate how cognitive interpretations of threat translate into tangible force-structure adjustments. By merging theoretical abstraction with empirical specificity, the literature review establishes the intellectual scaffolding for subsequent analysis and confirms that the phenomenon of perceived encirclement remains central to understanding the iterative escalation shaping the security order of East Asia.

This research adopts a qualitative, interpretivist methodology combining theoretical reasoning and empirical case analysis to investigate the causal relationship between the perceived U. S. military encirclement in East Asia and the evolution of China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy. The methodological design rests on three interlinked pillars: (1) theoretical framing within offensive and defensive realism, (2) discourse and document analysis of official Chinese sources and U. S. strategic statements, and (3) chronological and comparative tracing of alliance initiatives and Chinese military responses. Such a triangulated approach ensures analytical rigor and guards against theoretical bias by correlating perceptions, intentions, and observable actions across time. The realist theoretical lens provides the conceptual foundation of this study. Offensive realism suggests that major powers pursue military capabilities to ensure regional dominance (Mearsheimer, 2014), while defensive realism interprets similar behavior as security-seeking and threat-driven (Waltz, 1979). This dual framework allows the research to distinguish whether China’s A2/AD buildup represents offensive revisionism or defensive adaptation. Strategic perception theory further refines this lens by emphasizing the role of cognitive interpretation-policymakers act not on objective conditions but on how they perceive threats and opportunities (Larson & Shevchenko, 2019). Therefore, China’s concept of “encirclement” is treated not as a propaganda trope but as an operative analytical variable influencing strategic choice.

The empirical dimension relies on qualitative content analysis of open-source strategic documents and expert analyses. Chinese materials include The Science of Military Strategy (2001, 2013, 2020), Defense White Papers (2008, 2015, 2019), and official statements by the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defense (Ministry of National Defense, 2019). U.S. and allied sources comprise the U. S. National Security Strategy (2017, 2022), Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (2019, 2022), and multilateral agreements such as AUKUS and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines (Department of Defense, 2022). Supplementary data from RAND, CSIS, IISS, and SIPRI provide technical validation for specific military capabilities such as DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and PLA Navy modernization (Heginbotham et al., 2015; IISS, 2024; SIPRI, 2024). The analysis spans 2000–2025, capturing two decades of parallel strategic evolution. A chronological tracing method is employed to map the sequence of events linking U. S. alliance reinforcement and Chinese countermeasures. For instance, the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea in 2017 coincided with China’s acceleration of radar-evading missile development and electronic warfare capabilities between 2018 and 2020 (Department of Defense, 2022). Similarly, the announcement of AUKUS in 2021 aligns with intensified Chinese naval exercises and the operational deployment of DF-26 “Guam Killer” missiles in 2022 (Erickson & Wuthnow, 2020). These chronological correspondences are not treated as mere coincidence but analyzed as evidence of a feedback mechanism typical of the security dilemma: U.S. deterrence initiatives trigger Chinese defensive innovations, which in turn reinforce U. S. threat perceptions (Jervis, 1978).

The comparative analytical component contrasts the strategic narratives of both sides. While Washington’s discourse emphasizes “freedom of navigation” and “rules-based order” (Department of Defense, 2022), Beijing’s official statements portray these same actions as external containment (Ministry of National Defense, 2019). This narrative asymmetry forms the perceptual bedrock of the encirclement thesis. Through discourse analysis, the study identifies thematic patterns — “threat perception,” “territorial integrity,” “strategic autonomy,” and “intervention denial” — to reconstruct the cognitive environment in which China’s defense planners formulate their A2/AD policies. Methodologically, the study does not attempt to quantify the military balance numerically; rather, it seeks to explain causation through strategic logic. The mixed qualitative design provides explanatory depth, enabling the identification of patterns of perception and response otherwise obscured in quantitative models. By combining realist theory with documentary evidence and process tracing, the research establishes an interpretive causal chain linking U. S. alliance behavior to China’s evolving counter-intervention strategy.

Summary of Methodological Significance. This integrated framework captures both material and ideational dimensions of security behavior, demonstrating that strategic perception-specifically, the belief in encirclement-constitutes a critical independent variable shaping China’s defense evolution (Yan, 2019; Zhao, 2019). The approach ensures that conclusions drawn are not speculative but grounded in systematically correlated evidence, fulfilling the standards of empirical validity in contemporary international relations research.

Analytical Application

The analytical section applies this methodological framework to five core objectives, each explored through empirical evidence, interpretive reasoning, and theoretical reflection. The U. S. alliance system in East Asia represents a multi-layered network of bilateral treaties and multilateral frameworks designed to project stability and deterrence. Its key “spokes” include Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, while its “hubs” consist of the U. S. Indo-Pacific Command (Hawaii) and regional forward bases such as Yokosuka, Kadena, and Guam (Cha, 2016; Green, 2017). Since 2010, the United States has complemented this traditional architecture with emerging alignments: AUKUS (Australia — UK — US pact, 2021) and the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), which institutionalize strategic coordination (Friedberg, 2022; IISS, 2024). From China’s perspective, this dense lattice of partnerships and advanced weapons deployments creates an impression of encirclement. The proximity of U. S.-aligned facilities to China’s eastern seaboard-particularly missile defense systems in Japan and THAAD batteries in South Korea — magnifies this perception (Ministry of National Defense, 2019). Chinese defense literature frequently describes these initiatives as attempts to “compress China’s strategic space.” Empirical mapping shows that nearly all of China’s near seas fall within 1,500 km of a U. S. or allied base, placing key coastal provinces within potential strike range. Interim conclusion: the spatial configuration of the U. S. alliance network, viewed through strategic perception, substantiates China’s belief in encirclement.

Table 1

Methodological Framework of the Study

Official Chinese documents and writings by the PLA Academy of Military Science repeatedly invoke themes of sovereignty, deterrence, and external containment (PLA Academy of Military Science, 2013). The 2019 Defense White Paper explicitly references “hegemonic interference” and “attempts by external forces to infringe upon regional peace” (Ministry of National Defense, 2019). Such discourse reflects a strategic worldview shaped by historical memory — the “Century of Humiliation” which frames modern security anxieties (Yan, 2019). The A2/AD strategy encompasses a multilayered defense network aimed at denying adversaries operational freedom within the First and Second Island Chains. Its principal components include ballistic and cruise missiles (DF-21D, DF-26), advanced naval assets such as Type-055 destroyers, integrated air defenses (HQ-9, HQ-22), cyber and space warfare units, and maritime militia activities (Erickson & Goldstein, 2010; Cliff, 2015; Cheng, 2013). Each element supports the operational goal of deterring or delaying U. S. intervention in contingencies involving Taiwan or the South China Sea.

The proliferation of A2/AD capabilities has altered the strategic calculus in East Asia. Wargame simulations by RAND and CSBA indicate that U. S. carrier strike groups would be vulnerable within 1,500 km of China’s coast (Heginbotham et al., 2015). This has prompted U. S. adaptations such as the “Air-Sea Battle” concept (now Joint All-Domain Operations) and distributed lethality doctrines emphasizing dispersed operations and long-range precision fires (Department of Defense, 2022). For regional states, this dynamic produces a paradox: while U. S. alliances are intended to provide security, they simultaneously intensify the arms race (White, 2019; Allison, 2017).

The timeline analysis demonstrates reciprocal adaptation:

1. 2003–2008: U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan → China accelerates DF-21 modernization;
2. 2011–2014: Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” → China expands naval operations beyond the First Island Chain;
3. 2017: THAAD deployment in South Korea → PLA develops counter-ISR and jamming systems;
4. 2021–2023: AUKUS and EDCA expansion → China strengthens DF-26 deployments and satellite surveillance (Department of Defense, 2022).

This sequence exemplifies the security dilemma cycle: defensive measures by one side provoke countermeasures by the other. Over two decades, this iterative interaction has institutionalized a pattern of mutual adaptation defining Indo-Pacific strategic stability. Empirical evidence validates the hypothesis that perceptions of encirclement catalyze China’s counter-intervention strategy. The relationship between U. S. alliances and A2/AD evolution is reciprocal rather than unilateral.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This research demonstrates that China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy is not an isolated manifestation of military modernization but the direct product of a perception-driven security dilemma (Jervis, 1978; Larson & Shevchenko, 2019). The perceived encirclement by the United States and its allies functions as both a psychological and strategic variable shaping China’s defense posture (Yan, 2019; Zhao, 2019). Through qualitative analysis of strategic documents, case correlations, and theoretical interpretation, the study establishes that U. S. alliance expansion — while intended as deterrence — has catalyzed a counterbalancing process centered on A2/AD development (Department of Defense, 2022; Ministry of National Defense, 2019). Theoretically, the findings affirm the relevance of defensive realism and perception theory in explaining China’s security behavior. Material capabilities alone do not dictate strategy; rather, it is the interpretation of intentions that drives action (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2014). The U. S. — China dynamic epitomizes the tragedy of great-power politics: both actors pursue stability through deterrence yet inadvertently generate instability through misperception (Allison, 2017).

Practically, the implications are profound. For policymakers, recognizing the perceptual roots of China’s military behavior could inform confidence-building measures and arms control dialogues aimed at reducing miscalculation risks. Transparency mechanisms — such as prior notification of military exercises, mutual missile test declarations, and crisis communication hotlines — could mitigate uncertainty and de-escalate tensions (Friedberg, 2022). For regional states, maintaining a careful balance between engagement and deterrence is essential to avoid entrapment in great-power confrontation (White, 2019). Looking ahead, the sustainability of regional stability depends on reconciling competing narratives: the U. S. advocacy for a “rules-based order” and China’s emphasis on “sovereignty and development rights” (Department of Defense, 2022; Ministry of National Defense, 2019). Without addressing the underlying perception of encirclement, military competition will likely intensify, eroding crisis management capacity and increasing the probability of inadvertent escalation. In conclusion, this study reveals that the logic of counter-intervention embedded in China’s A2/AD strategy is both a symptom and a response to the enduring structure of U. S. alliances in East Asia. The encirclement-countermeasure dialectic will continue to shape the Indo-Pacific security order unless moderated by strategic empathy and institutionalized dialogue. Understanding perception as a driver of policy is not merely an academic exercise — it is a prerequisite for preventing the next great-power confrontation in the twenty-first century.

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