Introduction

The issue of Russian influence in Central Asia has been always highly debated topic among scholars. For centuries, Central Asia's geopolitical situation has been shaped by interactions with major powers, particularly Russia. Since the mid-1800s, Russia has had a strong influence in the region, a trend that continued through the Soviet and post-Soviet periods [1]. This influence extended to energy, security, and political areas, making Central Asia a key part of Moscow's foreign policy. However, the events following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 seem to have changed this established pattern. None of the Central Asian states supported the invasion or the annexation of territories, and questions have arisen regarding Russia’s intentions toward these countries. Given these ongoing geopolitical developments, Central Asia today has become a center of competition between the great powers- Russia, China and the collective West. Central Asia's geostrategic importance has grown even more, as Russia has found itself isolated on the international stage and actively trying not to give up its position as the region's leader and limit the outside influence. With China’s assertive growing influence and Central Asian leaders confident multi-vector diplomacy approach, Russian government fears of losing its traditional “privileged role”. The interplay between historical legacies and contemporary geopolitical tensions demonstrates that Central Asia is not merely an arena for the struggle for hegemony, but a region where the balance of power can shift depending on the political conditions. The combined presence of Russia’s military-security forces and China’s economic infrastructure creates overlapping spheres of influence, within which cooperation persists even against a backdrop of hidden competition. This article examines how Russia’s influence in Central Asia is transforming in the context of China’s rise and recent geopolitical shifts, focusing on three key issues: Russia’s sphere of influence in the region and its future role, the interaction of Chinese and Russian interests, and the position of Central Asian countries regarding the shifting balance of power.

Russia’s tool of influence

Among all of the great powers, Russia undoubtedly has the most extensive set of influence tools. For years, Russia’s traditional means of influence have included security forces, energy leverage, migrant labor reliance, and linguistic-cultural links. Russia sees its dominant role in Central Asia not simply as a strategic choice but as a historically grounded “right and responsibility”.

In terms of institutional leverage, the CSTO and the EAEU are Russia's main instruments. As Cooley puts it, “Moscow’s main instruments have been neither “Soviet” nor “neo-imperial,” but distinct attempts to emulate other successful contemporary regional organizations” [2, p. 52]. By “other” he means Western institutions NATO and EU, however, Russian organizations have proven to be less successful in monopolyzing relations with Central Asian governments. Many analysts are skeptical about Russian organizations, believing that they were not a collective alliance in the sphere of security and economy, but simply instruments for Russia to exert influence. Looking at more recent events, Russia's role as a guarantor of security appears to be diminishing with the increasing regional integration and the ability of Central Asian governments to resolve border issues independently. In the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s credibility as a reliable security provider has been significantly undermined, as evidenced by its limited and inconsistent response to conflicts between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and between Armenia and Azerbaijan [1]. The situation has been further complicated by Russia's redeployment of troops and military equipment from bases in Central Asia, as well as the mobilization of migrants and prisoners to the front lines [5]. Moreover, Putin's statements regarding Russia's territorial revisionism in the post-Soviet states are causing serious concern among the leaders of Central Asian countries. However, they realize that they cannot conduct anti-Russian policy and count on Western assistance, as Ukraine can, for example, because they all border with Russia and China, both of which take a similar position.

Analysts doubt the effectivness of the EAEU, for instance, Umarov [5] says that the volume of trade between countries within the union is less than the volume of trade with the outside world, unilateral restrictions are periodically imposed within the EAEU, and that Russia does not always consult with other union members on important decisions. The EAEU entails some degree of sacrifice of political sovereignty, which its members and potential members have always objected to. In addition, some EAEU rules contradict WTO rules, which is also a restraining factor for states to join [4]. But nevertheless, the EAEU is beneficial to some extent for Central Asian countries as it counterbalances the pressure of Chinese trade and economic expansion in local markets, and at the same time simplifies access to each other's markets and to Russia’s [5].

Labor dependency is another important tool for exerting influence on Central Asian countries. As Cooley writes, “the most important economic relationship with Russia is not in industry, but in people [2, p.63]. This is particularly true for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, whose GDP significantly depends on remittances from migrants. Very often, Russian authorities use migrants as a political weapon to reach its goals. Dadabaev et al. [3] cite labor dependence as one of the factors contributing to the “strategic silence” of Central Asian authorities and populations, forcing them to “digest” Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While it is mostly commented that Central Asia is heavily dependent on labor opportunities in Russia, Umarov writes that “Russia depends on Central Asia in almost all areas in which Central Asia depends on Russia”, arguing that Russia needs Central Asia’s cheap labor because it is experiencing demographic aging [5, p.6].

The Chinese threat to Russia's influence

The coexistence of two great powers in Central Asia is usually described as being based on cooperation and “division of labor” rather than competition. More than a decade ago, Cooley predicted that geopolitical challenge for Russia “comes not from the West, with which Russia has been so preoccupied, but from the East” [2, p. 70]. Even though it is not openly acknowledged, there is notable level of competition between two powers. For instance, the foundation of SCO challenged the position of CSTO as the region’s most influential security organization, which strongly frustrated Russian officials. In terms of the so-called “division of labor,” Russia is often described as a regional security hegemon, while China occupies the position of an economic hegemon [1]. However, this distinction is not absolute: Russia continues to play an important role in the regional economy, while China is increasingly expanding its presence in the security sphere. Moscow doesn’t seem to be worried about China's increased activity in the security sphere, because its interests coincide with those of China and for Moscow it is about sharing “the burden of responsibility” with Beijing [5]. The main priority for both Russia and China is to support the stability of authoritarian regimes in Central Asia and prevent them from getting closer to Western countries.

It is often believed that China is pulling Central Asian countries into a “debt trap,” but surprisingly, Umarov’s study demonstates that the total debt to China and Russia is almost equal: in the first half of 2023, Central Asia owed China $15.7 billion (7.6 % of total external debt) and Russia $14.3 billion (7 %) [5]. But there is however difference in credit policies, while Moscow lends only to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, China is the main creditor of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. There is also a significant difference in the economic presence of the two powers. The Chinese economy is considerably less dependent on and interconnected with the economies of Central Asian states than the Russian economy. Therefore, when comparing the positions of Russia and China in the region, it is important to take into account their distinct modes of influence. Russia is a country that is historically integrated into the region, while China has only recently entered the region. Even if there is some rivalry between Beijing and Moscow, it is compensated by the importance of Russian-Chinese bilateral relations, especially in the context of open US-Chinese and US- Russian confrontation. The decline of Russia's influence in Central Asian states will leave more room for China's growing presence, which is basically what is happening today. Some predicted that the “New Great Game” would be played out between Russia and China. However, how much of a threat Moscow sees China posing in Central Asia will depend on how much Beijing tries to turn its growing economic presence into political power [5].

Conclusion

Central Asia is effectively implementing its “multi-vector” policy, seeking to preserve its autonomy by diversifying its partners and avoiding unilateral orientation. The refusal to openly “take sides” or “strategic silence,” should not be seen as a lack of policy, but rather as a choice of maintaining good relations with all external players.

Russia's regional foreign policy cannot be understood in isolation, because Moscow's policy in Central Asia has been mostly shaped by its relations with other great powers- the US and China. This has always led to strategic shifts as Russia was attempting to match its hegemonic status claims with changing realities. Russia's influence is inevitable, and even if it weakens, geographical proximity makes it impossible to eliminate it completely. Excessive pressure from Russia and China may provoke a backlash because the governments of Central Asian countries may deepen their ties with Western states, the Islamic world, and also revive regional integration formats such as “CA+5.” Russia's influence would be most effective if Moscow accepted the fact that Central Asian states would not sacrifice their interests for Russia's geopolitical goals. But if Russia uses its instruments of influence to secure its “privileged role,” this is likely to cause dissatisfaction among the population and accelerate the decline of Russia’s prestige and influence in the region.

References:

1. Alexander, Cooley. Great games, local rules: The new great power contest in Central Asia / Cooley Alexander. —: Oxford University Press. — 51–80 с. —2012.
2. Brian, Carlson. Central Asia in an Era of Great-Power Rivalry / Carlson Brian. —// Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. — 2023.
3. Dadabaev, Temur & Sonoda Shigeto. Silence is golden? silences as strategic narratives in Central Asian States’ response to the Ukrainian crisis. / Temur Sonoda Shigeto Dadabaev. // International Journal of Asian Studies. — 2022. — С. 193–215.
4. Kazantsev, A., Medvedeva / Between Russia and China: Central Asia in Greater Eurasia / Kazantsev, A., Medvedeva [и др.]. —// Journal of Eurasian Studies. — 2021. — С. 51–71.
5. Umarov, Temur Дружба за влияние. Как Россия и Китай уживаются в Центральной Азии / Temur Umarov. —// Carnegie Endowment for International peace. — 2024.
6. Ziegler Russia in Central Asia: The dynamics of great-power politics in a volatile region / Ziegler, E. C. // Asian Perspective. — 2014.